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THE AUTHOR EFFECT AFTER THE "DEATH OF THE
AUTHOR": COPYRIGHT IN A POSTMODERN AGE
Elton Fukumoto
Abstract:. Copyright law employs terms and concepts, such as "originality" and
"authorship," which the Romantic movement developed. Post-structuralism and Post-
modernism, influential intellectual and artistic trends, have attacked the "author" concept by
undermining its philosophical foundations. But when Postmodem artists act in accordance
with their anti-author beliefs, they expose themselves to liability for copyright infringement.
Recent copyright cases illustrate the courts' not entirely satisfactory response to the artistic
appropriation of previous works. This Comment suggests that the courts read a pastiche
exception, broader than the current exception for parody, into the fair use defense for
copyright infringement.
"[TIhere is nothing new under the sun.'
Ecclesiastes
"The sun shone, having no alternative, on the nothing new."2
Samuel Beckett
The "author effect" is a concept in the academic discussion of
copyright law, and it refers to the effect that the Romantic conception of
the author-as-genius has had upon that body of law. To Peter Jaszi and
James Boyle, two of the developers of the author-effect idea, this
Romantic conception, although outdated and outmoded, still has an
influence on copyright law Romantic notions such as originality still
persist in the field even though in many cases corporations and other
collective entities are doing the creating.4 To Boyle and Jaszi, keeping
the notion of the author-as-genius allows too much intellectual property
protection.5
1. Ecclesiastes 1:9.
2. Samuel Beckett, Murphy, in The Collected Works ofSamuelBeckett 1, 1 (1970).
3. See James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the
Information Society x-xiii (1996); Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and
Collective Creativity, in The Construction of Authorship: Textual Appropriation in Law and
Literature 29,29-31 (Martha Woodmanse & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994).
4. See Jaszi, supra note 3, at 50-51.
5. See Boyle, supra note 3, at x; cf Jaszi, supra note 3, at 29-31 (finding that notion of
"authorship" in American copyright law persists, and that "authorship" concept hinders change in
copyright law to accommodate collaborative creative practices).
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The recognition that the "author" is a socially constructed concept and
that prior ages have not regarded originality as a condition of authorship
is due in large part to the influence of French post-structuralism.
Although other attempts to diminish the legal importance of originality
were current during the 1960s and 1970s, the French post-structuralism
movement, with its detailed theoretical apparatus and methodology,
proved to be more successful in providing a comprehensive anti-author
ideology. Post-structuralism pronounces the "death of the author"; our
age must do without the concept of the author.
Whereas the legal commentary drawing on post-structuralism's post-
author ideas deals primarily with a historical consideration of the author
concept, the post-structuralist perspective is actually boih historical and
philosophical. The historical claim that the author ideology was the
product of a particular epoch leads to the general philosophical point that
authors as originators do not exist now and indeed never existed. Only in
our time have we recognized that the "author" has died, and we must
come to terms with this development.
The other major movement of our time that has discarded the concept
of authorship is Postmodemism. Postmodern artists, to some extent
influenced by the post-structuralists, have accepted the death of the
author as a basic tenet; when they act upon that belief, through the
technique of appropriating the work of others, they run afoul of
copyright law.6
Although the practice of appropriation-imitating, copying, and
incorporating previous works of art-took place both before and after the
Romantic Period,7 the advent of copyright has made copying hazardous.
Richard Posner, no Postmodem radical, concedes that Shakespeare
would have been guilty of infringement had there been copyright during
his time.' Posner speculates that if the Romantic conception of the author
is ever superseded, the current copyright regime will inhibit the creativity
of the new movement: "So if the theory of literary creativity ever swings
back toward creative imitation, the copyright law, which in its present
form reflects the Romantic conception of creativity, will inhibit the
swing. The law would have to be changed before the new theory of
creativity could be fully applied."9 Such new theory, the post-
6. See infra text accompanying notes 97-100.
7. In English literature, the Romantic Period occurred between approximately 1798 and 1832. See
M.H. Abrams, A Glossary of Literary Terms 153 (6th ed. 1993).
8. Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation 348 (1988).
9. Id. at 351.
904
Vol. 72:903, 1997
Copyright in a Postmodern Age
structuralist/Postmodernist notion of the death of the author, had already
arrived, and this ideology conflicts with the current legal regime, just as
Posner said it would.
The goal of copyright is to "promote the progress of Science" through
the granting of limited monopolies to authors."0 For Postmodern artists,
the means of copyright law-the granting of exclusive rights to
authors-have become destructive of the end-the progress of the arts.
The fear of copyright infringement suits has had a chilling effect on
Postmodern artistic expression. A scheme intended to foster and
encourage artistic progress instead retards it by inhibiting some of the
arts' most daring and innovative practitioners.
Postmodern artists as well as post-structuralists, who believe that
copyright law has no philosophical justification, would probably like to
do without copyright altogether. Yet despite the fact that art and
literature flourished just as well before the institution of copyright as
after, the legal framework in this area is too deeply entrenched for its
complete removal to be seriously contemplated. Therefore, a more
modest change is in order: an adjustment of the fair-use defense could
help remove the liability that the current copyright regime imposes upon
Postmodern artists who borrow from copyrighted art.
This Comment explores the implications of post-structuralism and
Postmodernism for copyright law. The first section is an exposition of
the "author effect" and a discussion of a Supreme Court case illustrating
the continuing vitality of the author concept. The second section sets
forth various anti- and post-author movements in literary theory,
philosophy, and art. A traversal of this background material demonstrates
how thoroughly the concept of the author and the subject" has fallen into
disfavor. This Comment then analyzes two copyright cases dealing with
Postmodern art in order to illustrate the conflict between Postmodern
artistic practice and the law and to discern whether this conflict has been
resolved by these cases. Finally, this Comment suggests a means of
accommodating current artistic practice while keeping the language of
the current copyright statute. The proposed solution is a judicially
created category of fair use for pastiche along the lines of the present
allowance for parody. 2
10. U.S. Const. art. , § 8, cl. 8.
11. In Continental philosophy, "subject" is a term for the individual, self, or person.
12. Because this Comment concentrates on "backward-looking" justifications for copyright-
those which involve protecting the rights of authors-little is said about "forward-looking,"
utilitarian, or economic justifications. However, even proponents of the economic analysis of
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I. THE AUTHOR EFFECT
A. The Romantic Conception of the Author
The author effect 3 results from the Romantic conception of the
author. 4 The following statement of this belief is unexceptionable
because so widely held: "[A]n author is an individual who is solely
responsible-and therefore exclusively deserving of credit-for the
production of a unique work."' 5 These Romantic notions have caused the
unwarranted inflation of the importance of the author irt copyright law
and the negative effects resulting from this distortion:
[W]e are driven to confer property rights in information on those
who come closest to the image of the romantic author, those whose
contributions to information production are most easily seen as
original and transformative. I argue that this is a bad thing for
reasons of both efficiency and justice; it leads us to have too many
intellectual property rights.... If I am right, this unconscious use
of the author paradigm has wide-ranging negative effects, with
costs in areas ranging from biodiversity and the production of new
drugs to the shape of the international economy ....6
The ideology of the author developed in England during the
Eighteenth Century as the product of several developments: Locke's
notions about individualism, the rise of copyright laws, and English
Romanticism. 7 The Statute of Anne of 1710, the first copyright law,
copyright law arrive at conclusions similar to those expressed here. See supra text accompanying
notes 8-9. Posner acknowledges the negative impact that copyright laws have on the practice of
literary borrowing and proposes a narrowing of the scope of the laws to lessen the problem: "The
more extensive copyright protection is, the more inhibited is the literary imagination. This is not a
good reason for abolishing copyright altogether ... but it is a reason possibly for narrowing it, and
more clearly for not broadening it." Posner, supra note 8, at 348. As does this Comment, Posner
would focus on expanding the fair use defense. Id. at 351. A more thorough discussion of the
utilitarian analysis of the topics presented here would have to cover the thorny issue of the
relationship between aesthetic value and commercial value. This issue is difficult because neither
post-struecturalists nor Postmodernists believe in aesthetic value in theory, but in practice they cannot
seem to do without it Market analysis is also ill-equipped to deal with aesthetic value because of the
difficulties in quantifying the value.
13. See Jaszi, supra note 3, at 29.
14. See Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 41
Duke L. 455, 456 (1991).
15. Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the
Emergence of the "Author," 17 Eighteenth-Century Studies 425, 426 (1984).
16. Boyle, supra note 3, at x-xi.
17. See Jaszi, supra note 14, at 466-71.
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deployed the vocabulary of "authorship" in order to protect the interests
of booksellers."8 Authorship conveniently fit in with beliefs of that time
in individualism and natural rights. John Locke, for example, argued that
persons own their bodies, the labor produced by their bodies, and the
fruits of their labor. 9 It is natural to conclude that authors should reap the
benefits of their labors. When this ideology of individualism was
combined later in the century with the Romantic conception of the
author-as-genius-as the source of creativity, originality, and
inspiration-an entrenched ideology of the author resulted.2"
Romanticism, the literary movement associated with English poets
such as Wordsworth, Coleridge, Byron, and Shelley, did not appear until
the last decade of the Eighteenth Century, but the ideology of originality
has its sources earlier in that century.2' The essay On Lyric Poetry, from
1728, expressed the belief that "[o]riginals only have true life, and differ
as much from the best imitations as men from the most animated pictures
of them."' The influential essay Conjectures on Original Composition,
which appeared in 1759, promoted originality instead of the dominant
emphasis on mastering the conventions of classical literature and located
the source of originality in the poet's own genius.' These eighteenth-
century essays propounded two major assertions: inspiration, not
craftsmanship, was the source of literary invention, and that source was
internalized.24 "Inspiration" became identified with "original genius,"
and the work of literature became the product of the author.' For
Wordsworth, English Romanticism's leading figure, a genius does
something utterly new and produces something that never existed
before.26 This conception remains with us today.
Copyright law seems to depend upon this Romantic conception. The
Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science ... by securing for limited Times to Authors... the exclusive
right to their... Writings...."" Copyright is a grant of limited
18. aId at468.
19. See Marshall Leaffer, Understanding Copyright Law § 1.7 (2d ed. 1995).
20. Jaszi, supra note 14, at 471.
21. Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright 6 (1993).
22. Id (quoting Edward Young, On Lyric Poetry 414 (1728)).
23. Woodmansee, supra note 15, at 430 (construing Edward Young, Conjectures on Original
Composition (1759)).
24. ma at 427.
25. I11
26. lid at430.
27. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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monopoly to authors for the expression of ideas and thus provides an
economic incentive to create. Section 102 of the Copyright Act of 1976
deals in general with the subject matter of copyright: what it is that
copyright protects.2" Section 102(a) states that copyight protection
subsists in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression.29 Thus, the statute makes originality a requirement for
protection and imbues authorship with the ideology of Romanticism. The
next section discusses how originality became not merely a statutory, but
also a constitutional requirement.
B. The Author Effect in Feist v. Rural Telephone
The Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co.3" reaffirmed the continuing influence of the Romantic
conception of the author on copyright law. Feist represents the high
water mark for the author ideology in American case law: "[F]rom first
to last, [Feist's] rhetoric proceeds from unreconstructed faith in the
gospel of Romantic 'authorship." ''3 In Feist a unanimous Court affirmed
originality as a constitutional requirement for copyright protection. 2
In Feist the issue before the Court was whether copyright protection
was available to telephone directory white pages.3 Rural Telephone
Service Company provided telephone service to portions of northwest
Kansas and published a telephone directory with white and yellow
pages. 4 Feist Publications was a company that put out area-wide
telephone directories. Because Feist did not have independent access to
subscriber information, it had to apply to the telephone companies for
licenses to use their white pages listings. 5 When Rural refused to grant a
license, Feist published Rural's listings without its consent. Rural sued
for copyright infringement. 6
The Court held that because Rural's white pages lacked the requisite
amount of originality, Feist's use of Rural's material could not constitute
28. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
30. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
31. Jaszi, supra note 3, at 38.
32. Feist, 499 U.S. at 361.
33. Id. at 342.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 343.
36. Id. at 343-44.
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copyright infringement.3 Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous
Court, found that "[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement."3 The
Court strongly suggested that it is beyond the power of Congress to
extend copyright protection to anything lacking the sine qua non of
originality: "As a constitutional matter, copyright protects only those
elements of a work that possess more than a de minimis quantum of
creativity."'39 This quantum is a "minimal creative spark"' or "some
creative spark, 'no matter how crude, humble, or obvious .... "'4' The
work at issue in this case was entirely lacking in originality, and the
Court concluded, "were we to hold that Rural's white pages passed
muster, it is hard to believe that any collection of facts could fail."'42
The unanimous Feist Court affirmed in the strongest possible manner
the continuing importance of originality as a necessary condition of
copyright. The Lockean labor theory alone is insufficient to explain the
requirements of the law in this area.43 Notions such as creativity and
originality only make sense within the intellectual framework of the
Romantic conception of the author, a framework which gives content to
these notions. The opinion in Feist cannot be explained in economic
terms as a concession to publishers and distributors because it runs
counter to their interest in protecting their investment in gathering
information." There is no indication that the Court weighed the social
benefits of making information more generally available against the
private costs of denying it protection.45 Instead, the opinion is dominated
by the vocabulary and rhetoric of Romanticism.
Thus copyright law, as expressed in Feist, is thoroughly grounded in
the Romantic conception of the author. In the next section this Comment
explores the chief intellectual and artistic alternative to this orthodoxy.
When this alternative belief in the death of the author concept is actually
put into practice, the theoretical conflict between alternative conceptions
37. Id. at 364.
38. Id. at 346.
39. d at 363.
40. I at 345.
41. Id. at 345 (quoting 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright
§ 1.08[C][I] (1990)).
42. Id. at 364.
43. The Court explicitly rejected the "sweat of the brow" doctrine, which had been observed by
some lower courts. The Court said copyright could not be granted solely as a reward for the hard
work that went into compiling facts. Id. at 352-53.
44. Jaszi, supra note 3, at 37.
45. Id
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of the author can become a legal conflict in which the law proscribes
work which does not conform to the Romantic ideology.
II. THE DEATH OF THE AUTHOR
Copyright law's reliance on the author conception becomes
increasingly problematic if one considers the artistic and intellectual
trends that view the "author" as a social construct. This attack on the
"author" and challenge to the Romantic conception has been effected in
large part by three anti-author movements: Anglo-American literary
theory, which developed after New Criticism and preceded the
importation of Continental theory; post-structuralism, especially the
work of Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, and Jacques Derrida; and the
trend in twentieth-century art called Postmodernism. A full consideration
of these ideas will reveal just how far the author and subject have fallen
into disfavor. This Comment will discuss these three trends in the
chronological order in which they became important within the
American academy.
A. Anglo-American Literary Theory
The New Criticism dominated American literary studies in the 1950s
and 1960s. The New Critics concentrated on the interpretation of single
works of art, showing how the formal structure of the work mirrored the
work's theme and how the work was a self-contained unity. Opposition
to the New Critics' emphasis on the individual work arose in the
criticism of influential literary theorists such as Northrop Frye and
Harold Bloom, both of whom viewed literature as intertextual. For Frye
and Bloom, one could best understand a given work of literature by
understanding literature as a whole.
1. Northrop Frye
For Frye, poetic creation does not typically occur when a suitably
talented person sits down with pen and paper and produces a poem
ex nihilo.46 On the contrary, literature is so highly conventional that no
creation is possible without extensive borrowing: "[p]oetry can only be
made out of other poems; novels out of other novels."47 Only the
46. See Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays 97 (1957).
47. Id
Vol. 72:903, 1997
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dominant belief in authors as "onlie begetters"'' 8 leads us to assess the
author's appropriation negatively:
Most of us tend to think of a poet's real achievement as distinct
from, or even contrasted with, the achievement present in what he
stole .... But any serious study of literature soon shows that the
real difference between the original and the imitative poet is simply
that the former is more profoundly imitative.49
"Stealing" in art and literature is actually a virtue, a point Frye
supports by citing T.S. Eliot's observation that a good poet is more likely
to steal than to imitate." With respect to the law, Frye laments that
copyright has made it "difficult for a modem novelist to steal anything
except his title from the rest of literature ...
2. Harold Bloom
Bloom's view represents the flip side of Frye's. For Bloom every poet
in the tradition of English and American literature since Milton
appropriates from precursor poets, but that appropriation is accompanied
by guilt and the anxiety of influence.52 Every poem is a reading or rather
a misreading of a previous poem: "Influence, as I conceive it, means
that there are no texts, but only relationships between texts. These
relationships depend upon a critical act, a misreading or misprision, that
one poet performs upon another...." 3 The act of writing a poem is a
misreading of a previous poem, and "[a]s literary history lengthens, all
poetry necessarily becomes verse-criticism .... ."' Common to both
Bloom and Frye is the notion that literature borrows or misappropriates
its material from previous works.
48. This is a phrase from Shakespeare's dedication to his Sonnets. William Shakespeare,
Shakespeare's Sonnets 3 (Stephen Booth ed., Yale Univ. Press, 3d prtg. 1980) (1609).
49. Frye, supra note 46, at 96-97.
50. M at 98.
51. Id. Since Frye's examples, such as The Sound and the Fury and For Whom the Bell Tolls, are
works in the public domain, his point is more profitably taken in a psychological rather than a legal
sense. The current copyright regime inhibits "stealing" from previous work even if the appropriation
were perfectly legal.
52. See Harold Bloom, The Anxiety ofInfluence: A Theoy ofPoetry 5-11 (1973).




Post-structuralism, particularly the work of French philosopher
Jacques Derrida, provides the most extensive and filly articulated
rationale for dispensing with the author concept. In sum, the post-
structuralists argue that language, not a solitary author, writes texts.
Their views, though seemingly radical, cannot be dismissed easily
because of their substantial influence within the American academy in
general and also specifically within the legal academy through the
critical legal studies movement."
The attack on the author function has its roots in the prior work of
structuralism, the French intellectual movement that applied structural
linguistics to the study of human culture. Structuralism de-emphasized
the roles of human consciousness and individuals in understanding the
meaning of cultural phenomena. In fields such as psychoanalysis,
anthropology, and literary criticism, structuralists applied a method,
borrowed from the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure,56 in
order to extract meaning from texts or events. The structuralist method
could reveal what was really going on beneath the misleading surface."
Post-structuralism took the next logical step. It concurred in the "death
of the subject," but without the comforting assurance that a method could
provide us with an interpretive key to self-understanding. To post-
structuralists, the idea that a method could give us the real meaning of a
text simply repeats the similar mistake of finding out what a text means
by asking its author. The post-structuralist attack on the author is part of
a more sweeping criticism of the concepts of a subject, an individual, a
55. Post-structuralist ideas in general are influential in humanities depari:nents and in social
science departments such as political science and history. Within the academic study of law, the
critical legal studies movement is heavily indebted to post-structuralist theory. See J.M. Balkin,
Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 Yale LJ. 743 (1987) (discussing post-structuralism
from critical legal studies perspective); James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory
and Local Social Thought, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 685 (1985); Thomas C. Heller, Structuralism and
Critique, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 127 (1984); Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of
Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429 (1987').
56. Swiss linguist, 1857-1913.
57. A well-known example of the structuralist method at work is Claude ILdvi-Strauss's analysis
of the Oedipus myth. See Claude L.vi-Strauss, The Structural Study of Myth, in Structural
Anthropology 206 (Claire Jacobson & Brooke Grundfest Schoepf trans., 1963). If you want to
understand what this myth means, LUvi-Strauss says, you must read it in terns of its variants and
related narratives. If you map out the elements of these variants on a grid, patterns will emerge. In
this case, the Oedipus myth is about the conflict between believing that hurian beings had their
origin in the ground like plants and believing that human beings are products of men and women. Id.
at 216. The method is supposed to reveal the real meaning of the narrative, imspective of what the
commonly accepted or authorial meaning might be. Id at 210-11.
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consciousness, a method, and a meaning. Each of these concepts is a
philosophical fiction that has its uses, but that post-structuralists see as
having no existence prior to its social construction. Each post-
structuralist has a different way of dealing with or discarding these now-
discredited concepts.
1. Michel Foucault
Despite the substantial number of literary and critical voices that have
been raised against the concept of the author, opposition to it only
became fully visible as a viable intellectual position after the appearance
of Michel Foucault's What Is an Author? in 1969.8 His essay does not
argue for the death or disposal of the author; it assumes it. The article
arises out of an intellectual milieu in which "criticism and philosophy
took note of the disappearance-or death-of the author some time
ago." 9 The essay presents a general description of how various historical
developments, including the creation of an ownership system for texts
during the late Eighteenth Century, have shaped the modem conception
of the author.' To Foucault, authors do not exist in nature, they are
socially constructed.6'
The legal commentary62 on What Is an Author? focuses on the
argument concerning the social construction of the author, while
downplaying the essay's more radical claim: we can and should do
without the concept of the author.6' Foucault argues that although the
removal of the author can only be gradual, it would be desirable because
authors today serve to constrict, not create, meaning.6
58. Michel Foucault, What Is an Author?, in Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist
Criticism 141 (Josu6 V. Harari ed., 1979). For another anti-author work from the same period, see
Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (1967). While not a work critical of authors,
Stephen Breyer's article, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1970), argues for limiting copyright
protection and dates from the same era.
59. Foucault, supra note 58, at 143.
60. Id at 148.
61. See id. at 153.
62. See Jaszi, supra note 3, at 29-30; James Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and
the Framers, 37 Am. U. L. Rev. 625, 635 (1988).
63. Foucault, supra note 58, at 159-60.
64. Id. at 159.
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2. Roland Barthes
Roland Barthes's "The Death of the Author ' 5 shows how post-
structuralism replaces authors with texts or language itself. The age of
the author ended around the time of the poet Stephane Mallarme.'
Writers or scriptors have replaced authors, and texts have replaced
works: "In France, Mallarme was doubtless the first to see and to foresee
in its full extent the necessity to substitute language itself for the person
who until then had been supposed to be its owner. For him, for us too, it
is language that speaks, not the author."'67 We are now living in the age of
the text. The dominant metaphor returns to the etymological roots of the
word; a text is like a textile or piece of cloth, something to be
disentangled, not deciphered." The text is only a flat suiface; there is no
meaning beneath or inside: "the structure can be followed, 'run' (like a
thread of a stocking) at every point and at every level, but there is
nothing beneath."69 With respect to the now-outmoded conception of the
"work," the author was regarded as the "father and owner of the
work .... The Text, on the other hand, is read without the father's
signature."'7 According to Barthes, the figure of the author no longer
serves to limit or control the meaning and function of his own text.
3. Jacques Derrida
Derrida's work, sometimes referred to as "deconstruction" or
"deconstructionism," provides the most thorough and sweeping
philosophical justification for undermining the concept of the author,
individual, or consciousness. He tries to show that the tradition of
Western thought since Plato depends upon such concepts as truth,
presence, substance, subject, "consciousness, God, man, and so forth."'"
"Deconstruction" is the name of the project to undermine these concepts.
Deconstruction does not mean destroying the structure of Western
thought. That may indeed be the eventual goal, but it canot be achieved
65. Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, in Image-Music-Text 142 (Stephen Heath trans.,
1977).
66. French Symbolist poet, 1842-1898.
67. Barthes, supra note 65, at 143.
68. Id. at 147.
69. Id.
70. Roland Barthes, From Work to Text, in Textual Strategies: Perspectivzs in Post-Structuralist
Criticism, supra note 58, at 73, 78.
71. Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference 279-80 (Alan Bass trans., 1978).
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all at once. Instead, deconstruction seeks to weaken the structure by
employing the tools of Western thinking against itself: "the passage
beyond philosophy does not consist in turning the page of philosophy...
but in continuing to read philosophers in a certain way."72
Derrida's anti-author arguments are similar to Barthes's.73 The act of
writing does not entail having authors on one side and the words they
produce on the other. Since authors are in some way already made up of
words, there is nothing beneath or behind language. Derrida explains that
symbols, signs, and language produce themselves and are not produced
by something outside them: "the genetic root-system refers from sign to
sign. No ground of non-signification-understood as insignificance or an
intuition of a present truth-stretches out to give it foundation under the
play and the coming into being of signs."' The way to make sense of
this is to see human intelligence as a language-producing machine. What
we call consciousness is already composed of signs, not something
separate from them: "From the moment that there is meaning there are
nothing but signs. We think only in signs."75
Another major aspect of deconstruction relevant to this discussion is
its reversal of the traditional priority of speech over writing; by putting
writing over speech, deconstruction does away with the author. The
traditional view of speech can be found in Plato's Phaedrus.76 In that
dialogue Socrates denigrates writing as an inferior copy of spoken
discourse." A written argument cannot defend itself: "when it is ill-
treated and unfairly abused it always needs its parent to come to its help,
being unable to defend or help itself.""8 Writing is dead; speech is living.
Writing is merely a copy, an imitation, an image of the original spoken
discourse.7 9
72. Id. at288.
73. Foucault, Derrida, and the later Barthes are all considered post-structuralists. However, they
did not set out to form such a "school" or movement. Derrida and Foucault in particular have major
disagreements: Foucault is certainly not a deconstructionist like Derrida, and Derrida would find
Foucault's concern with power to be retrograde. They would agree in their anti-humanism-in the
death of the author or subject-and in the related notion that all human activity and thinking takes
place within a discourse or language.
74. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology 48 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., Johns Hopkins
1974) (1967).
75. Id. at 50.
76. Plato, Phaedrus, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato 475 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington
Cairns eds., Lane Cooper et al. trans., 5th prtg. 1969).




On the other hand, to Derrida language is writing, not speech (even
though historically writing developed after speech) because language is
an articulated, non-living machine capable of being written down: "That
a speech supposedly alive can lend itself to spacing in its own writing is
what relates it originarily to its own death."8 Writing fanctions beyond
and survives the death of its author:
To write is to produce a mark that will constitute a sort of machine
which is productive in turn, and which my future disappearance
will not, in principle, hinder in its functioning .... I ought to be
able to say my disappearance, pure and simple, my nonpresence in
general, for instance the nonpresence of my intention of saying
something meaningful .... 8
The repeatable character of writing allows it to be "cut off from all
absolute responsibility, from consciousness as the ultimate authority,
orphaned and separated at birth from the assistance of its father"82 which
is what Plato condemned in the Phaedrus."3 But, leSt this paternity
metaphor mislead us, Derrida would say that the father was not even
present at the moment of conception; there never was an originary
consciousness that produced the text. There never was any such
consciousness that was not always already written. In sum, Derrida
attacks the notion of authorial originality through his sweeping denial
that human consciousness, as a non-linguistic, non-material entity,
produces language.'
80. Derrida, supra note 74, at 39.
81. Jacques Derrida, Signature Event Context, in Limited Inc 1, 8 (Gerald Graffed., 1988).
82. Id.
83. Plato, supra note 76, at 511-521.
84. One might expect that a person such as Derrida would not have very much respect for
copyright laws. Indeed, he intentionally abused the fair use exception when he quoted nearly all of
an article he was commenting on. In the essay Limited Inc a b .. ., Derrida responded to an essay
by philosopher John Searle called Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida. Derrida's essay,
nearly one hundred pages long, incorporated almost all of Searle's essay, iacluding the copyright
mark: "I have quoted a paragraph in extenso. Adding up all the quotes, I believe that I will have cited
the Reply from beginning to end, or almost. Did I have the right(s)?" Jacques Derrida, Limited
Inc a b c.... in Limited Inc, supra note 81, at 29, 101. Derrida muses that if he were hauled into
court for copyright infringement, he would get "to explain to the court all the implications
(psychoanalytic, political, juridical, censorial [policigres], economic, etc.) of this debate .... Id.
Although Derrida never considers copyright, that is, never treats it in detail is a topic, his views on
the matter seem clear from his more gdneral claim that language operates without fathers.
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C. Nineteenth-Century Precursors of the Death of the Author Ideology
1. Ralph Waldo Emerson
As post-structuralist ideas began to filter into the United States in the
1970s, scholars took a second look at American intellectual traditions to
see if similar notions had previously surfaced. One rediscovery was the
essay Quotation and Originality by the central figure of American
Romanticism, Ralph Waldo Emerson. 5 This essay shows that Emerson's
Romanticism was tempered by a recognition of the huge indebtedness
each author bears to past work: "Our debt to tradition through reading
and conversation is so massive, our protest or private addition so rare and
insignificant,-and this commonly on the ground of other reading or
hearing,-that, in a large sense, one would say there is no pure
originality. All minds quote. 86 This condition is not limited to current
authors; even the earlier "original" authors could not avoid quoting:
"None escapes it. The originals are not original."8"
2. Justice Joseph Story
Emerson's anti-author sentiments are echoed in the legal opinions of
his older contemporary Justice Joseph Story, a member of the Supreme
Court from 1811 to 1845 and one of the most important figures in the
common law of copyright. In an 1845 opinion, Story wrote:
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be,
few, if any, things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and
original throughout. Every book in literature, science and art,
borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was
well known and used before.88
What are the implications of such a view for copyright law? Story
does not seem too concerned. If a work had to be fully original in order
to be copyrighted, no work would ever be eligible:
85. Quotation and Originality appeared in 1868. See Albert J. von Frank, An Emerson
Chronology 442 (1994).
86. 8 Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Complete Works ofRalph Waldo Emerson 178 (1904).
87. Id. at 180.
88. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436); cf Kaplan, supra
note 58, at 2 ("Education, after all, proceeds from a kind of mimicry, and 'progress,' if it is not
entirely an illusion, depends on generous indulgence of copying.").
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The thoughts of every man are, more or less, a combination of what
other men have thought and expressed, although they may be
modified, exalted, or improved by his own genius or" reflection. If
no book could be the subject of copy-right which was not new and
original in the elements of which it is composed, there could be no
ground for any copy-right in modem times .... 89
Yet for Story, the mere fact that most works are predominantly
unoriginal is not a bar to copyright. It is the unique arngement of pre-
existing materials which is copyrightable: "In truth, every author of a
book has a copyright in the plan, arrangement and combination of his
materials, and in his mode of illustrating his subject, if it be new and
original in its substance."' The questions that remain unanswered and
that will be explored further in this Comment are these: what happens
when the copyright holders of the "elements" or "materials" complain
about infringement? Does a response by infiingers that borrowing is
inescapable save them from liability? The next section discusses an
entire artistic movement that borrows freely from previous works and
thus brings into sharp relief the conflict between Romantic and post-
structuralist conceptions of the author.
D. Postmodernism
The last source of the attack on the author ideology is Postmodemism.
It is the dominant artistic movement of the second half' of the twentieth
century and is characterized by playfulness, self-consciousness, and
liberal borrowing from previous art. Whereas post-structuralist
discussion of the death of the author has a theoretical and abstract
character, Postmodemism's concern with these issues is far more
practical because the current copyright laws are at odds with the central
Postmodem practice of appropriation, the borrewing from or
incorporation of elements of previous works.
Postmodernism grows out of Modernism, the artistic movement
dominant in the first half of this century, and represents both a
continuation of and a passing beyond Modernism. That earlier movement
emphasized the formal elements of art, and this emphasis on form over
content made Modernist works difficult and inaccessible to the general
public. Modernism promoted this separation from popular success; there
was high art, which to Modernists was real art, and popular art, which
89. Emerson, 8 F. Cas. at 619.
90. Id.
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was not. While sharing many of the same aesthetic concerns of
Modernism, Postmodernist artists consciously aim their appeal at a wider
audience, and it is this effacement of the distinction between high and
popular art which most clearly differentiates the two movements.
The characteristic feature of Postmodernist art that has the greatest
legal significance, appropriation, actually has its roots in Modernism: for
example, in the poetry of Eliot and Pound and in the music of Charles
Ives. Aesthetic terms for appropriation include quotation,9" collage,92 and
pastiche.93 The basic idea of this technique is to incorporate material
from previous works of art, and by rearranging them or changing their
context, comment upon this pre-existing material. A humorous early
example is Marcel Duchamp's "L.H.O.O.Q.," which is a copy of
Leonardo's "Mona Lisa" with a mustache painted on.' Even funnier is
Duchamp's further twist, called "Shaved/LHOOQ," which is a postcard
of the Mona Lisa without the mustache.95 The point of this unapologetic
borrowing of existing artistic material is to call originality into
question.96
"Pastiche" is a term for Postmodern appropriation, and it is a "well-
nigh universal practice."97 One can define "pastiche" by distinguishing it
from "parody": "Both pastiche and parody involve the imitation or,
better still, the mimicry of other styles and particularly of the
91. E. Kenly Ames, Note, Beyond Rogers v. Koons: A Fair Use Standard for Appropriation, 93
Colum. L. Rev. 1473, 1478 (1993) ("Postmodemists are distinguished by their frequent quotation of
previously existing works and styles, often taken from popular culture, in their search to uncover
meaning in the processes by which contemporary society functions.").
92. John Carlin, Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property Law, 13
Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 103, 106 (1988). Carlin writes:
By mid-century this method [direct incorporation of source material from other texts and from
popular culture] had become pervasive, with many of the most influential artists... making
collage-like appropriation central to their work. Over the past few years there have been
increasing signs that this tendency has become part of mainstream cultural expression, and not
just an avant-garde art. Music video, music mastermixes, popular film and television, and even
mainstream advertising currently manipulate source material by direct copying rather than by
transforming and re-using original themes.
Ha
93. See Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism 16 (1991)
[hereinafter Jameson, Cultural Logic]; Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism and Consumer Society, in
The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture 111, 113 (Hal Foster ed., 1983) [hereinafter
Jameson, Consumer Society].
94. Carlin, supra note 92, at 109.
95. Id.
96. See Ames, supra note 91, at 1478.
97. Jameson, CulturalLogic, supra note 93, at 16.
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mannerisms and stylistic twitches of other styles."98 Parody mocks an
original work, and it depends upon a linguistic or artistic norm in
contrast to which the parodied version can be seen as ridiculous. What
would happen, however, if no one believed any longer in artistic or
linguistic norms?
That is the moment at which pastiche appears and parody has
become impossible. Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a
peculiar or unique style, the wearing of a stylistic mask, speech in a
dead language: but it is a neutral practice of such mimicry, without
that still latent feeling that there exists something normal compared
to which what is being imitated is rather comic. Pastiche is blank
parody, parody that has lost its sense of humor .... 99
As Jameson sees it, this lack of a personal style differentiates
Postmodernism from Modernism, and recognition of this lack is due in
part to the rise of post-structuralism and its announcement of the 'death
of the subject' or, to say it in more conventional language, the end of
individualism as such."'" Although the early Postmod.mists predated
post-structuralism, at a certain point their concerns began to intersect, no
more clearly than on this issue. The "death of the subject" proponents
divide into two camps, which correspond roughly to historical and post-
structuralist views.''
The post-structuralist position is the more radical of the two: "[N]ot
only is the bourgeois individual subject a thing of the past, it is also a
myth; it never really existed in the first place; there have never been
autonomous subjects of that type.""02 Once the belief in a unique self and
personal style, which was part of the Modernist and Romantic ideologies,
is gone, what is left for artists to do? Only pastiche:
Hence, once again, pastiche: in a world in which stylistic
innovation is no longer possible, all that is left is to imitate dead
styles.... But this means that contemporary or Postmodernist art is
going to be about art itself in a new kind of way; even more, it
98. Jameson, Consumer Society, supra note 93, at 113.
99. Id. at 114.
100. Id.
101. According to this Comment's alignment, Woodmansee, Rose, Barthes, and Jaszi are on the
historical side, and only Derrida and perhaps Foucault are on the post-structuralist side. Although
Emerson and Frye are not post-structuralists, they would more easily fall in the Derridean camp
because they do not limit their skepticism about style and originality to a particular historical
development. See Frye, supra note 46 and accompanying text; Emerson, supra Part II.C.I.
102. Jameson, Consumer Society, supra note 93, at 115.
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means that one of its essential messages will involve the necessary
failure of art and the aesthetic, the failure of the new, the
imprisonment in the past.0 3
In sum, Postmodernism put into practice the death-of-the-author
principles fully developed by post-structuralists. The Postmodern
practice that embodies post-structuralist beliefs is called pastiche or
appropriation: the creation of art through the incorporation of pre-
existing artistic material. But when an artist borrows or incorporates
material from a copyrighted work of art, she exposes herself to liability
for infringement. The next section explores the law's response to this
situation.
III. COPYRIGHT LAW'S RESPONSE TO THE DEATH-OF-THE-
AUTHOR BELIEFS AND POSTMODERN ARTISTIC
PRACTICE: TWO CASES
This Comment now examines two relatively recent copyright cases in
light of the philosophical and artistic developments outlined in the
previous section: Rogers v. Koons1" and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc.' In the first case, the Second Circuit displayed a highly
unsympathetic attitude toward Postmodern artistic practices based upon
death-of-the-author beliefs. In the second, the Supreme Court moved
toward a more flexible stance concerning the same artistic practices.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not go far enough to remove
entirely the threat of infringement liability for artistic appropriation.
These cases show that there is a conflict between the law and
Postmodern beliefs and practices. The present law has not reached a
satisfactory accommodation with these novel artistic techniques. In order
to allow for the freer development and progress of innovative forms of
art, a more expansive interpretation of the fair use defense is needed.
Because the fair use defense was raised in both cases, at this point a
brief exposition of the fair use doctrine may prove helpful. The
Copyright Act of 1976 grants to copyright owners exclusive rights in
their works, rights subject to enumerated limitations.0 6 Perhaps the most
important of these limitations, fair use, is described in section 107."07 Fair
103. Id. at 115-16.
104. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
105. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
106. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
107. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
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use is a defense in copyright infringement suits. Even if a plaintiff has
made out a prima facie case for infringement, a defendant is not liable if
the use was fair.' Examples of fair use include quotation; from works in
book reviews or scholarly articles. Fair use is allowed because its
prohibition "would inhibit subsequent writers from attempting to
improve upon prior works" and thus frustrate the progress of science.,' 9
Of course, the fair use protection applies to other categories of works,
such as art and music, beyond literature. "
A. Rogers v. Koons
Postmodern aesthetic beliefs collided with the reality of the current
copyright regime in Rogers v. Koons."' The Second Circuit found
sculptor Jeff Koons liable for copyright infringement when he put
Postmodernist beliefs into practice by appropriating ihe work of a
photographer. Koons produced a piece of sculpture closely based upon
Rogers's photograph of a couple holding a number of small dogs." 2 The
outcome of the case intensifies the conflict between art and the law over
the issue of appropriation. The decision against Koons means that unless
the fair use statute or its interpretation changes, Postmodern artists will
be forced to abandon central beliefs and practices for fear of exposure to
infringement claims. For reasons which this Comment explores in greater
detail in the next section, the Court's decision in Acuff-Rose, while
moving in the right direction, still falls short of saving Koons and
Postmodem artists like him.
Even before Koons there was a general recognition in the art world
that the Postmodern practice of appropriating material from previous
artists andipopular culture presented legal difficulties. Prominent artists
such as Robert Rauschenberg, Andy Warhol, Larry Rivers, and David
Salle settled infringement suits out of court."3 Also, commentators,
writing before the lawsuit in Koons had been filed, noted the chilling
108. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
109. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (quoting H. Ball,
Law of Copyright andLiterary Property 260 (1944)).
110. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (extending
fair use protection to public's use of videotape recorders to record television broadcasts).
111. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
112. Id. at 304-05.
113. Martha Buskirk, Commodification as Censor: Copyrights and Fair Use, 60 October 83,
100-01 (1992) (discussing Rauschenberg, Warhol, and Salle); Patricia A. Krieg, Note, Copyright,
Free Speech, and the Visual Arts, 93 Yale L.J 1565, 1568 (1984) (mentioning Warhol,
Rauschenberg, and Rivers).
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effect of the current law and all but predicted the outcome of Koons,
which set a precedent in the area of artistic appropriation."' One art critic
lumped Richard Prince and Sherrie Levine"5 in with Koons as "flagrant
appropriators" who could easily run afoul of the law."6 The point is that
Koons is not the first, the last, or the worst postmodernist appropriator.
His legal problems are symptomatic of a large-scale clash of artistic and
legal cultures. The present copyright law has the unfortunate effect of
inhibiting the work of some of the most important artists of our time; in
so doing it has become an obstacle to progress in the arts.
Postmodern artist and sculptor Jeffrey Koons exhibited twenty
sculptures at what he called the "Banality Show" at New York's
Sonnabend Gallery in 1988."' The exhibition resulted in four lawsuits,
all based on misappropriation." 8 The theme of the show was the
relationship between art and money, and the pieces displayed were what
Koons called "Commodity art.""' 9 The art/money theme is central to
Postmodemism; in this particular case, the interrelationships between the
two are convoluted and ironic. Unlike a more typical artist, Koons had
been a commodities broker, a fact important enough to be mentioned in
the Koons opinion, 2° and "[h]is five years' experience on Wall Street
fueled the resentment' against him in the art community.' The show, on
the other hand, purported to be a criticism of the shallowness, the
banality, of a commercialized, commodified society. The court's opinion
paraphrased Koons's assertion that:
[Hie belongs to the school of American artists who believe the
mass production of commodities and media images has caused a
114. See Carlin, supra note 92, at 111 ("Regardless of its cultural or artistic value, the
appropriation of imagery validly protected by copyright or trademark currently would give rise to
substantial liability for infringement under Chapter 5 of the Copyright Act and Subchapter III of the
Trademark Act of 1946 (the 'Lanham Act')."); Krieg, supra note 113, at 1568 ("The absence of a
definite legal standard for appropriation of visual images results in a chilling of freedom of speech
interests. Artists will hesitate to experiment with creative modes if such experimentation may result
in liability for copyright infringement.").
115. Prince and Levine are Postmodem photographers who rephotograph famous photos. Prince
appropriates images, such as the Marlboro man, wholesale from the mass media. See Johanna
Drucker, Theorizing Modernism: Visual Art and the Critical Tradition 137-40 (1994). Levine
specializes in rephotographing "masterworks." Id at 137.
116. Carlin, supra note 92, at 113.
117. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304 (1992).
118. Martha Buskirk, Appropriation Under the Gun, Art in Am., June 1992, at 37, 41.
119. See Anthony Haden-Guest, True Colors: The Real Life of the Art World 151 (1996).
120. Koons, 960 F.2d at 304.
121. Haden-Guest, supra note 119, at 151.
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deterioration in the quality of society, and this artistic tradition of
which he is a member proposes through incorporating these images
into works of art to comment critically both on the incorporated
object and the political and economic system that created it."2
Despite his anti-commercial stance, Koons made out quite
handsomely, his share of proceeds from the show amounting to three
million dollars by one account." It is unlikely that he would have
presented such a tempting target or been punished so severely if he had
done substantially less well. 24 But this irony or even paxadox is typical
of Postmodernism, which aspires to popular success while making the
shallowness of contemporary culture its theme."
The object of controversy in Koons was the sculpture called "String of
Puppies," depicting a man and a woman on a bench holding a row of
eight puppies. Although some differences exist, the sculpture reproduces
much of the photograph "Puppies," which inspired it.126 "Puppies" was
the work of Art Rogers, who created it in 1980 and marketed it in
notecard form beginning in 1984.127 In 1987 Koons purchased a copy,
tore off the copyright insignia, and sent the photo to an Italian foundry
which would execute Koons' instructions in constructing the sculpture. 21
Koons chose the photograph because it was "seminally banal,' 29 and one
art critic declared that Koons "was able to turn it into a piece that could
122. Koons, 960 F.2d at 309.
123. Haden-Guest, supra note 119, at 150-51.
124. Cf. Lynn A. Greenberg, The Art ofAppropriation: Puppies, Piracy, anmi Post-Modernism, 11
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 1, 32 (1992).
125. A similar irony infects the Romantic conception of the author. At the same time that an
ideology developed that viewed artists and authors as inspired creators writinjg for the ages and not
for money, economic conditions, including copyright, made it more feasible for writers and
musicians to earn their own living free of patronage. Samuel Johnson, the gnmt 18th century critic
and essayist, illustrates this contradiction. On the one hand, he wrote the Lives of the Poets, which
Woodmansee says "contributed decisively to the differentiation of'authoring' from ordinary literary
labor by establishing a pantheon of great authors whose 'works' differ qualitatively from the sea of
mere writing." Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, in The
Construction of Authorship 15, 18 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994). On the other
hand, Johnson penned this dismissive, deflationary epigram about his profes.ion: "No man but a
blockhead ever wrote, except for money." See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
584 (1993) (quoting 3 Boswell's Life ofJohnson 19 (G. Hill ed., 1934)).
126. Ames, supra note 91, at 1473 n.l.
127. Koons, 960 F.2d at 304.
128. Id at 305.
129. See Haden-Guest, supra note 119, at 151.
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both exhilarate you and make your hair prickle."'3° When Rogers found
out about Koons's unauthorized use, he sued for infringement.'
The district court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff on
the issue of liability for infringement, and the Second Circuit affirmed,
remanding the case back to the lower court to determine the amount of
the award against the defendants.'32 The appeals court found that
"Puppies" met the originality requirement set out in Feist: "[T]he
quantity of originality that need be shown is modest-only a dash of it
will do."'3 The court also agreed that Koons's copying was so "blatantly
apparent as not to require a trial"'34 and that Koons had used the
"identical expression of the idea that Rogers created."'35 Koons's
assertion of a fair use defense did not evoke a sympathetic response. In
section three of its opinion, the court went through the four factors
considered in determining fair use and found against him on each one.'36
It did not accept his assertion that his work was a parody or satire. 37
Finally, the Second Circuit speculated that on remand for the
determination of damages, Koons "may be a good candidate for
enhanced statutory damages pursuant to 17 U.S.C. section 504(c)(2)" in
light of "Koons' willful and egregious behavior."'38 Eventually, Koons
settled out of court; the terms of the settlement remain confidential. 39
The published reaction to the Second Circuit's opinion was
overwhelmingly negative. 41 The focus of concern was the implications
130. IM
131. Koons, 960 F.2d at 305.
132. Id. at 305-06, 313. The other defendant in the case was Sonnabend Gallery. Id. at 301.
133. Id. at 307.
134. Id
135. Id. at308.
136. The four factors, found in § 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, are as follows: the purpose
and character of the use; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the
portion used relative to the copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect of the use upon the potential
market for the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
137. The first paragraph of § 107 allows for fair use for the purposes of, among other things,
criticism and comment. 17 U.S.C. § 107. Satire and parody are artistic genres that fall within those
categories. This aspect of fair use was the focus in Acuff-Rose.
138. Koons, 960 F.2d at 313.
139. See Martha Buskirk, Koons Lawsuits Settled, Art in Am., Dec. 1993, at 118, 118. Koons has
also settled the three other cases that arose out of the Banality exhibition. Id In one of those three
other cases, the district court found against Koons. See United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817
F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
140. See, e.g., Patricia L. Baade, Photographer's Rights: Case for Sufficient Originality Test in
Copyright Law, 30 J. Marshall L. Rev. 149, 173 n.164 (1996) (listing five essays critical of Rogers v.
Koons and none in support).
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the case had for Postmodem artistic strategies in general. One art critic
found the decision "rife with ominous implications for the practice of
artistic appropriation," a practice "central to postmodern art,"'' and a
legal commentator criticized the appellate court as being "'remarkable for
its hostility toward Koons and to appropriation strategies in post-
modernist art in general."' 42 The art critic of The New Yorker, while
ambivalent toward Koons's work, worried that the Second Circuit's
decision had made life difficult for a broader range of artists: "Even
classic Pop art would be impossible to make now. The Campbell Soup
Company-not to mention the cartoonists whom Roy Lichtenstein lifted
from-would probably sue."'43
From the post-structuralist/Postmodernist perspective, neither the
outcome nor the reasoning of Koons was satisfactory. First, the concept
of originality hurt Koons twice: the court found Rogers's work
sufficiently original and Koons's work to be unoriginal to the extent that
it copied Rogers's.'" The irony is that Koons says he chose the
photograph because he found it "seminally banal,""' in other words, trite
or unoriginal. Moreover, as we have seen, Postmodernism as a
movement criticizes the notion of originality. 146 With respect to the
relationships between life, the photograph, and the sculpture, one can
easily claim that Koons's work is far more different from the photograph
than the photograph is from the sculpture: "[N]ot only the placement of
the figures, but also the lighting and expression of Koons's sculpture, are
radically different from Rogers's underlying photograph .... Gone is the
'charming' and cuddly warmth of Rogers's photograph, and in its place
141. Buskirk, supra note 118, at37.
142. Greenberg, supra note 124, at 26. Even Rogers's lawyer was surprised by the opinion and its
tone: "'It was a pretty strong opinion from the court-surprising even to me,' :;ays Rogers's lawyer
L. Donald Pruzman. 'I think they are truly offended not only by what Jeff did but by the arrogant
way he tried to defend himself.' Robin Cembalest, The Case of the Purloined Puppy Photo,
ARTnews, May 1992, at 35, 35. For other negative reaction to the Koons decision, see Ames, supra
note 91, at 1485: "If one recognizes the value of the critical function performed by even the most
extreme appropriationist art, the need for a standard to prevent the quite predictable chilling effect of
the Koons decision on artists' free choice of source material is clear." See also Louise Harmon, Law,
Art, and the Killing Jar, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 367 (1994) (finding much to mourn in Koons's defeat).
143. Adam Gopnik, The Art World: Lust forLife, New Yorker, May 18, 1992, at 76,78.
144. The court said the photograph more than met the Feist test. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301,
307 (2d Cir. 1992). On the other hand, "Koons used the identical expression of the idea that Rogers
created... no reasonable jury could have differed on the issue of substantial similarity. For this
reason, the district court properly held that Koons 'copied' the original." Id at 338.
145. Haden-Guest, supra note 119, at 151.
146. See Ames, supra note 91, at 1478 ("The postmodernists challenge the foundations of
modernist theory by questioning whether art can ever be original ....").
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is a garish, perhaps horrifying, perhaps hilarious image."'47 The striking
difference in the context of each work-the notecard and postcard
market versus the glamorous world of a prestigious New York art
gallery-failed to impress the court. What is so arresting about this case
is that from the point of view of the dominant aesthetic of our time,
Postmodemism, Koons's work seems clearly better, or more significant
than Rogers's, and the members of court just seem to be bad judges of
art. In fact, the court dismissed Koons's concern that "a trial judge
uneducated in art is not an appropriate decision-maker" because that
decision-maker need only have the skills of a reasonable and average lay
person.'48 This claim is not quite in line with Holmes's sense that it
would be dangerous for persons trained only in the law to make aesthetic
judgments.'49 The dangers are all too aliparent in this case and are
compounded by the reasonable inference that the Second Circuit, serving
the New York area, should have more expertise in this field than does
any other circuit. Judges should either be better educated in art or more
open to consulting experts.
A second and related problem with the decision is that the court lost
sight of the goal of copyright: "To promote the Progress of
Science.. . "'o To the Framers, "Science" was a broad term which
included the arts and sciences. As interpreted by the Court in Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,151 the ultimate goal of copyright is to
promote artistic creativity by protecting an author's creative labor: "The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an
author's creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good."' The Koons
court concentrated on the immediate effect of protecting Rogers by
making him whole and by punishing Koons.' But the court neglected to
consider whether it is Rogers's productions or Koons's that are more
aesthetically valuable and hence more beneficial to the public. The court
either does not address this question at all or considers the question
automatically answered when the court applied the provisions of the
147. Greenberg, supra note 124, at 27.
148. Koons, 960 F.2d at 308.
149. See Bleistein v. Donaldson, 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
150. U.S. Const. art. , § 8, cl. 8.
151. 422 US. 151 (1975).
152. IL at 156.
153. The court suggested that statutory damages would be appropriate. Koons, 960 F.2d at 313.
There is an implicit recognition that market injury to Rogers may not amount to much. Enhanced
statutory damages, on the other hand, may run up to $100,000. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1994).
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statute. 5 4 The suppression of an artistic movement does not serve the
public good. Every decision concerning the copyright of artistic works
needs to consider the aesthetic as well as economic values involved.
The final problem with Koons is the court's handling of the fair use
doctrine, specifically the tradition of allowing parodies.' 5 Section 107 of
the 1976 Copyright Act states that fair use of a copyrighted work is not
infringement. The statute lists "criticism" and "comment" as two of
several purposes constituting fair use,1 6 and courts interpret this
provision to allow parodies and satires as exceptions to infringement.' 57
As a Postmodernist, Koons argued that his sculpture was a satire or
parody of society at large.5 8 The court, however, stressed that a parody
must ridicule or criticize the original work. 59 "String of Puppies" was
not a parody because "the copied work must be, at least in part, an object
of the parody."'" This rule was held to be a necessary condition of the
parody exception, "otherwise there would be no real limitation on the
copier's use of another's copyrighted work to make a statement on some
aspect of society at large."'' If all an infringer had to do was to claim a
"higher or different artistic use," as Koons did, "there would be no
practicable boundary to the fair use defense."' 62 From a post-
structuralist/Postmodern point of view, although the finding of no parody
is wrong, the reasoning makes sense. If use of a preexisting work simply
for another artistic use were allowed, the fair use defense would hardly
have any limits at all. For the Postmodern artist, whose use of prior
works in pastiche is pervasive, such a condition is devoutly to be wished.
A porous exception would mean not having to worry about infringement
at all. It was precisely to forestall this possibility that the court rejected
154. One might argue that promoting the public good is Congress's concern and not the
judiciary's. This Comment concludes that the present statute, particularly the section on fair use, 17
U.S.C. § 107 (1994), is already broad enough to accommodate a much more favorable attitude
toward artistic appropriation. If the courts do not adopt the proposed interpretation of § 107,
Congress will have to make statutory amendments.
155. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
156. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
157. See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that "When Sonny Sniffs
Glue" is fair use of song "When Sunny Gets Blue"); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. NBC, Inc., 482 F. Supp.
741 (S.D.N.Y.) (finding that "I Love Sodom," parodying advertising jingle "I Love New York," is
fair use), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
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Koons's Postmodernist assertions and that artistic tradition along with it:
"Koons' claim that his infringement of Rogers' work is fair use solely
because he is acting within an artistic tradition of commenting upon the
commonplace thus cannot be accepted."'6 Of this passage in the opinion,
one commentator has said, "In these few words, the court has effectively
discredited an entire artistic movement."'" The Koons court declared that
the current copyright regime cannot accommodate Postmodem
appropriation. But the court's view of parody and fair use has not been
the final one.
B. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,'" the Supreme Court found
that a rap group's rendition of a well known song "Oh, Pretty Woman"
was not presumptively unfair and the extent of the group's borrowing
not excessive.'" The 2 Live Crew version borrowed or incorporated
elements of Roy Orbison's original. 67 Although the rap version arguably
does not target or criticize the original song, the Court accommodated the
rap song within an expanded parody category. The decision represents
the Court's best effort to date to deal with the issue of artistic
appropriation. From the post-structuralist/Postmodemist point of view,
the outcome was correct, although the reasoning not yet fully
satisfactory. The Court seems to be stretching or twisting the existing
definition of "parody" in order to achieve the desired result.
Unfortunately, the reasoning of the Acuff-Rose decision would still be
insufficient to protect Koons. Nevertheless, the Court in Acuff-Rose
moved decisively in the right direction when confronted by unfamiliar
artistic practices. In considering this case, the Court seemed to have the
Aiken court's aim-the stimulation of artistic creativity for the public
good-firmly in mind."68 What is needed beyond Acuff-Rose is the
introduction of pastiche as a protected artistic genre.
Acuff-Rose involved a case of appropriation in music. Luther
Campbell, a member of the rap-music group 2 Live Crew, wrote a song
called "Pretty Woman," a parody of the rock ballad "Oh, Pretty
163. Id.
164. Greenberg, supra note 124, at 29.
165. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
166. Id. at 594. The Court remanded the case because of a lack of evidence concerning market
harm. Id at 593-94.
167. Id at572.
168. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
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Woman."' 6 9 The earlier song's writers, Roy Orbison and William Dees,
had assigned their rights to the song to Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. When
2 Live Crew applied to Acuff-Rose for permission to make use of the
song for a fee, Acuff-Rose refused. 70 The rap group released its version
of the song, and Acuff-Rose sued for copyright infiingement."'7 The
Court held that the commercial nature of 2 Live Crew's parody did not
render it presumptively unfair.'72 The Court also found that the Sixth
Circuit had insufficiently considered the nature of parody when it
weighed the degree of copying. 73 All parties agreed that the rap group
would have infringed on Acuff-Rose's rights but for a finding of fair use
through parody.74 Before going over the four non-exclusive factors in
the copyright statute75 that help to determine whether a use is fair, the
Court said that both the fair use doctrine and the statute call for a case-
by-case analysis.'76 Crucial with respect to the Court's consideration of
each of the four factors was the finding that the rap version constituted a
parody.
177
The Court's conception of parody is broader and more flexible than a
prior one, which required the critical targeting of the :Initated work. 78
The Court looked for guidance at the preamble of section 107, which
lists uses for the purposes of "criticism" and "commenf' as examples of
fair use of the copyrighted work.179 Applying and interpreting these two
exceptions, the Court asked whether the new work adds something new
or is "transformative."'80 As a matter of law, the Court found that parody
in general "has an obvious claim to transformative: value."'' The
interesting move was this: although the Court referred to two dictionary
169. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 572.
170. Id. at 572-73.
171. Id. at 573.
172. Id. at 594.
173. Id. at 572.
174. Id. at 574.
175. See supra note 136.
176. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 577.
177. Id. at 578-94.
178. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180,
185 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that parody
deserves protection as fair use only if copied work is partly target of work in question).
179. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 578-79.
180. IM at 579. This term was developed by Judge Pierre Leval. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair
Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1111 (1990).
181. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579.
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definitions of parody, both of which explicitly state that parodies make
works, authors, or styles the objects of ridicule, the Court did not require
that the parody criticize the earlier work. 2 Commentary was held
sufficient: "For the purposes of copyright law, the nub of the definitions,
and the heart of any parodist's claim to quote from existing material, is
the use of some elements of a prior author's composition to create a new
one that, at least in part, comments on that author's works."'8 3 If the
commentary has no "critical bearing on the substance or style of the
original composition," the new work's claim to fair use is weaker, and
other factors, such as commerciality, become more important."s
Nevertheless, implicit in this discussion was that failure to ridicule or
criticize the prior work does not by itself prevent the new work from
being a parody. Lowering the criticism requirement allowed 2 Live
Crew's song to qualify as a parody because it "reasonably could be
perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it, to some
degree."'85 The fair use defense is appropriate here even though the
critical element is slight or weak. Moreover, in a footnote the Court says
that works even less critical of originals than 2 Live Crew's song is of
"Oh, Pretty Woman" may still qualify as parodies.'86 Especially when
there is no danger of market substitution, "taking parodic aim at an
original is a less critical factor in the analysis, and looser forms of parody
may be found to be fair use."' 87 One commentator finds that the dicta in
this footnote may be sufficient to protect Koons and other Postmodern
artists like him, although other passages in the opinion make this
protection far from certain. 8
Despite this broadening of the scope of the parody category of fair use
and the quotation of death-of-the-author sentiments from Justice Story,8 9
the Court does not unequivocally extend protection to works of
182. Il at 580.
183. Id
184. Id.
185. ld at 583.
186. Id at 580 n.14.
187. IR
188. See A. Michael Warecke, Note, The Art of Applying the Fair Use Doctrine: The
Postmodern-Art Challenge to the Copyright Law, 13 Rev. Litig. 685, 746-47 (1994) ("This footnote
may provide sufficient coverage to protect virtually all limited-edition, fine-art postmodern parody,
as well as satire.').
189. See supra text accompanying note 88.
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appropriationist art."9° Just as the Second Circuit found that Koons's
work did not criticize or target the original, so might that court have
found that it did not comment upon the original either; hence, Koons's
sculpture could still fail to qualify as a parody. The Court was doing the
best it could with the available vocabulary, but the outcome in Acuff-
Rose is not unequivocal enough to provide the desired relief. The
development of new statutory language or novel readings of the current
one are necessary to remove the threat of legal action and to allow
Postmodern artists freely to practice their craft.
IV. PASTICHE AS FAIR USE
The fact that current copyright law inhibits artistic "creativity"19 '
argues strongly in favor of limiting copyright protection for works of art.
In order to demonstrate how significant an impact that inhibition can
have, we only need recall that Shakespeare borrowed or appropriated
extensively from previous writers: "The methods of Shakespeare suggest
that copyright law even in its present modest scope-perhaps any
copyright law, however narrow-inhibits literary creativity, at least of
the type that his work displays."'92 Having Shakespeare suppress Hamlet
for fear of infringing upon Thomas Kyd's earlier versior would not be a
desirable outcome of any legal regime. Similarly, one should not support
the chilling effect of the current law upon Postmodern appropriation.
The change in the law contemplated here is to expand the fair use
defense in order to allow more extensive artistic borrowing. 93 The
language of the current section 107194 is broad enough to accommodate
adequate judicial expansion of fair use. Interpretation of section 107
should be expanded to include a pastiche category of fair use. Pastiche,
like parody, involves imitation and mimicry, but of a neutral sort,
without the mockery. 95 A standard handbook of literary terms defines
"pastiche" as "[a] literary or other artistic work created by assembling
190. See Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors, and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property,
18 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 1, 62-63 (1993); Roxana Badin, Note, An Appropriate(d) Place in
Transformative Value: Appropriation Art's Exclusion from Campbell v. Acuf."-Rose Music, Inc., 60
Brook. L. Rev. 1653, 1653 (1995) (finding that Acuff-Rose excludes Koons and other appropriation
artists from fair use protection).
191. The term is in quotation marks because "creativity" in a Postmodern sense now includes
creative borrowing.
192. Posner, supra note 8, at 344.
193. Id. at 351.
194. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
195. See supra notes 98-99, 103 and accompanying text.
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bits and pieces from other works."'96 The term covers precisely those
aspects of Postmodemist art most deserving and in need of a defense.
One legal question relevant in establishing a fair use exception for
pastiche is whether the preamble to section 107 applies to works which
copy a prior work without targeting it for criticism or comment.' 97 Courts
have assumed that the infringing work must comment on or criticize the
copyrighted work in order for the use to be fair. However, a reasonable
reading of the preamble would show that its wording, "the fair use of a
copyrighted work.., for purposes such as criticism, comment.., is not
an infringement of copyright," does not require that the copied work
itself be the object of criticism or comment. The later work may use the
earlier for the purposes of criticizing or commenting on something else.
If that major shift in the way the courts understand the preamble becomes
standard, a pastiche fair use defense would then be possible. The artist's
infringement would be judged on a case-by-case basis through a
weighing of the relevant factors. The artist could explain how her use of
the prior work is not "to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in working
up something fresh,' 9 8 but instead to enrich her work through allusions
to previous art. In other words, her use is transformative and adds value
to the original; it is "the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine
intends to protect for the enrichment of society..'...
Whether or not the Koons court is right in predicting that a removal of
the requirement that the criticism be of the copied work would mean the
end of any limits on the fair use defense, pastiche is a legitimate and
productive artistic genre which ultimately contributes to our self-
understanding. The institution of a defense for pastiche will remove
copyright law as an impediment to creativity in art, music, and literature.
V. CONCLUSION
The Romantic movement in art and literature had its heyday during
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, yet its effect on the
rhetoric and vocabulary of copyright law remain. Both before and after
the Romantic period, a recognition existed that imitation, borrowing, and
copying was an inevitable part of creating works of art, but only in the
196. The Harper Handbook to Literature 339 (Northrop Frye et al. eds., 1985).
197. One should mention that in some circumstances a finding of fair use is possible even when
the infringing work does not fit any uses listed in the preamble. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (finding fair use defense applicable to non-productive use).
198. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569,580 (1994).
199. Leval, supra note 180, at 1111.
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post-Romantic period did such artistic appropriation constitute copyright
infiingement.
Post-structuralism and Postmodernism have challenged Romantic
ideology and called for the death of the concept of the author. The
logical extension of their beliefs to copyright law would mean the
wholesale or gradual destruction of the current copyright regime. That
ambitious result is not achievable in the near future, but in the meantime,
the present law hurts Postmodem artists who act upon their belief that art
is made out of other art. Although the Acuff-Rose Court tried to
accommodate artistic appropriation through its expansion of the fair use
defense for parodies, better protection for Postmodern artists would come
through judicial recognition of a pastiche category of fair use. Such a
recognition would remove a legal impediment to the progress of the arts.
